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Comment
John P. McEvoy*

Characterization of Limitation
Statutes in Canadian Private
International Law: the Rocky
Road of Change

Prior to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Tolofson v. Jensen'
limitations statutes were characterized, prima facie, as procedural for
purposes of Canadian private international law. The principal authority
for this characterization was the 1835 case of Huber v. Steiner2 in which
an action was brought on a promissory note made in France in 1813 and
payable in 1817. The defendant argued that the French Code de commerce applied and that the right of action was extinguished by the
provision that "all actions ...prescribe themselves by five years reckoning from the day of protest ..... Tindal C.J. recognized the general rule
that
so much of the law as affects the rights and merits of the contract, all that
relates "ad litis decisionem," is adopted from the foreign country; so much
of the law as affects the remedy only, all that relates "ad litis ordinationem,"
is taken from the "lex fori" of that country where the action is brought.3
Applying this right/remedy distinction, Tindal C.J. was not satisfied that
the French prescriptive law extinguished the contractual right and held
that it merely limited availability of a remedy before the French courts.
Subsequently, in Leroux v. Brown,4 the familiar legislative formula
"no action shall be brought" was characterized as procedural rather than
substantive. In that case, an oral contract for the supply of poultry and
eggs had been entered into in France for delivery to the plaintiff in
England. The contract, with a duration of one year, was to commence at
a future uncertain time, i.e. not to be performed within one year. By the
law of France the contract was enforceable but, before the English court,

* Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton. E-mail: McEvoy@UNB.CA.
I acknowledge, with appreciation, the helpful comments of my colleagues Karl Dore and
Geoffrey Bladon on an earlier draft of this comment.
1. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 [hereinafter Tolofson].
2. (1835), 132 E.R. 80 (C.P.).
3. Ibid. at 83.
4. (1852), 138 E.R. 1119 (C.P.) [hereinafterLeroux].
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5
the defendant pleaded the English Statute of Frauds
provision that "no
action shall be brought upon any agreement which is not to be performed
within the space of one year from the making thereof ... -"6Though the
reasoning of the members of the court is essentially an exercise in literal
statutory construction, the characterization issue was addressed by Jervis
C.J. with the words, "I am of opinion that the 4th section applies not to the
solemnities of the contract, but to the procedure;" 7 and Maule J. stated:
"It is parcel of the procedure and not of the formality of the contract."8
For a period in excess of 150 years, private international law in
England and common law Canada was certain: limitation periods were,
primafacie, procedural. The only real question was whether the statute
in issue proscribed the right as well as the remedy.9
In Tolofson, the plaintiff, a resident of British Columbia and an infant
at the time of the accident, had been seriously injured in an automobile
accident in Saskatchewan. Eight years later, the plaintiff commenced
action in British Columbia against both the British Columbia driver of the
vehicle in which he was a passenger (his father) and the Saskatchewan
driver of the other vehicle. Under British Columbia law, the lexfori, the
action was not proscribed, but under the law of Saskatchewan, the lex loci
delicti, the action was barred as not having been commenced within
twelve months from the date of injury.' 0 In its decision in Tolofson, the
Supreme Court rejected the "traditional" forum-biased Anglo-Canadian

5. (1677) 29 Car. II, c. 3, s.4.
6. Leroux, supra note 4 at 1129.
7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. at 1130.
9. In the Canadian context, see for example: Limitations ofActions Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L- 15,
s. 44; LimitationsAct, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 236, s. 9 (am. 1990 c. 33); LimitationsofActions Act,

R.S.M. 1987, c. L150,s. 53; LimitationsAct, S.N. 1995, c. L-16.1,s. 17(1); Art. 2921 C.C.Q.;
and Limitations of Actions Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-15, s. 46 all of which expressly provide that
the right of a person is extinguished after the expiration of the applicable limitation period.
Morris notes that there is Scottish, Australian and American authority supporting the
characterization of special statutes such as FatalAccidentsActs as substantive. The reason for
this characterization is the linkage with the right created under the statute which specifically
reforms the common law as opposed to the position of general limitations legislation. See: J.D.
McLean, Morris: The Conflict of Laws, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) at 386.
10. Vehicles Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. V-3, s. 180(1): "no action shall be brought against a person
for the recovery of damages occasioned by a motor vehicle after the expiration of twelve
months from the time when the damages were sustained."
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choice of law rule in tort" in favour of the rule of lex loci delicti for
intra-Canadian torts with a discretionary exception in favour of the lex
fori for international torts. Accordingly, under the new rule, the substantive law of Saskatchewan, as the lex loci delicti, applied to determine the
substantive rights of the parties and the law of British Columbia, as the
lexfori, governed procedural matters with respect to the litigation. The
characterization of limitations legislation was, therefore, unavoidably in
issue.
La Forest J., for the Court, 2 acknowledged two justifications at
common law for the "procedural" characterization of limitations legislation in Anglo-American private international law. First, "that foreign
litigants should not be granted advantages that were not available to
forum litigants" and second, that a right of action at common law
"endured forever."' 3 The firstjustification is a mirror of the usual concern
of forum shopping. The common law rationale is not that a foreign
plaintiff will seek to take advantage of a longer limitation period in the
forum but would be advantaged by a longer foreign period not available
to domestic litigants. The forum shopping concern is that the procedural
characterization permits a plaintiff whose cause of action has been
proscribed in the natural forum, if one exists, to seek a forum with an
unexpired limitation period. The second common law justification was
rightly described by La Forest J. as "mystical"' 4 and superseded by
contemporary Canadian jurisprudence recognizing a mutuality of interest of both plaintiff and defendant in limitation periods such that expiration of a limitation period vests a protective right in the defendant. 5
11. The traditional test developed from the case of Phillipsv. Eyre (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (Ex.
Ch.) in which Willes J. stated the rule as follows (at 28-29):
As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to have been
committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such
a character that it would have been actionable if committed in England.... Secondly,
the act must not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done.
This rule was modified by the English Court of Appeal decision in Machado v. Fontes, [ 1897]
2 Q.B. 231 such that "not ... justifiable" in the second condition meant "not innocent", thereby
permitting a plaintiff to recover, even if there was no civil liability, if the act giving rise to
complaint was in violation of a criminal or quasi-criminal law. It was this formulation of the
rule that was applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in McLean v. Pettigrew, [1945]
S.C.R. 62.
12. On the issue of limitations, La Forest J. wrote for a unanimous court of seven justices.
Sopinka and Major JJ. each wrote brief separate reasons for decision in which they would not
foreclose an exception to the lex loci delicti rule for choice of law in relation to intra-national
torts. See Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1027-28.
13. Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1069.
14. Ibid.
15. Citing Perriev. Martin, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 41 and Yew Bon Tew v. Kenderaan Bas Mara,
[1983] 1 A.C. 533 (P.C.).
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The core justification for a "substantive" characterization is found in
La Forest J.'s statement that
[tihe notion that foreign litigants should be denied advantages not available to forum litigants does not sit well with the proposition, which I have
earlier accepted, that the law that defines the character and consequences
of the tort is the "lex loci delicti". 16
While textually in response to the first common law rationale for a
"procedural" characterization, this statement is particularly significant
because it alludes to the fundamental premise that informs other issues in
private international law, such as the incidental question and renvoi. That
premise is that the law identified by the applicable connecting factor or
choice of law rule, the lex causae, determines the rights and liabilities
between the parties to the greatest extent possible. Private international
law, as a system, is subverted by tools, such as characterization, when
applied purposely to defeat the application of the appropriate foreign law
by expanding the scope of the lex fori. A prime example of a court
recognizing this reality is the decision of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal in Block Bros. Realty v. Mollard.17 The British Columbia defendants responded to the claim of an Alberta real estate agent by arguing that
the plaintiff agent was not licensed in British Columbia and, therefore,
prevented from bringing an action by virtue of British Columbia legislation that an unlicensed agent "shall not maintain an action in any court for
the recovery of compensation .. ."18 The court, per Craig, J.A., established the principle that "legislation should be categorized as procedural
only if the question is beyond any doubt. If there is any doubt, the doubt
should be resolved by holding that the legislation is substantive."' 9 This
principle clearly favours the widest scope for the lex causaeand properly
narrows that of the lexfori to procedural laws, truly and narrowly defined.
It is consistent with the very purpose for the existence of private
international law.
Significantly, the "substantive" characterization adopted by the Supreme Court in Tolofson is consistent with the promotion of uniformity
of result. As La Forest J. noted, it is the characterization generally
accepted in civil law systems2 ° and has been statutorily introduced in the

16. Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1070.
17. (1981), 122 D.L.R. (3d) 323 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Block Bros.].
18. Real Estate Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 356, s. 37.
19. Block Bros., supra note 17 at 328.
20. See, for example Art. 3131 C.C.Q.: "prescription is governed by the law applicable to the
merits of the dispute" and Swiss Statute on Private InternationalLaw (1990), 29 I.L.M. 1244,
art. 148(1): "The law applying to a claim governs time-barring and extinction thereof."

Characterization of Limitation Statutes in Canadian Private International Law

429

United Kingdom through the ForeignLimitations Act, 1984.21 In addition, four of the Hague Conventions: Convention of 4 May 1971 on the
Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents;22 Convention of 2 October 1973 on
the Law Applicable to ProductsLiability;23 Conventionof2 October,1973
on the Recognition and Enforcement of DecisionsRelating to Maintenance Obligations;24 and Convention of 22 December 1986 on the Law
Applicable to Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods25 expressly
provide that the applicable law under the convention governs issues of
26
"prescription and limitation of actions.
Unfortunately, this legal consistency to which Tolofson joins Canada
is not shared in the United States where limitation period legislation is
permissibly characterized for full faith and credit purposes as procedural.
This approach was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in
1988 in Sun Oil v. Wortman, 7 in which Justice Scalia concluded that
[tihe historical record shows conclusively, we think, that the society which
adopted the Constitution did not regard statutes of limitations as substantive provisions, akin to the rules governing the validity of contracts, but
rather as
procedural restrictions fashioned by each jurisdiction for its own
28
courts.

The Court refused to hold that a more modern approach, i.e. to characterize limitations periods as substantive, is constitutionally required under
full faith and credit, and stressed the permissive nature of the constitutional provision. Accordingly, it is open to each state of the United States
to adopt either a "substantive" or "procedural" characterization of sister
state limitations legislation. The procedural characterization was also
recently affirmed by the High Court of Australia in McKain v. R.W. Miller

21. (U.K.) 1984, c. 16. See also: The Law Commission, Classification of Limitation In
PrivateInternationalLaw (Law Com. No. 114)(London: H.M.S.O., 1982).
22. Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents, (1988)
Am. J. Comp. L. 589.
23. Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, (1973)
21 Am. J. Comp. L. 150, (1972) 1 I.L.M. 1283.
24. Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 On The Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions
Relating to Maintenance Obligations, (1973) 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 156.
25. Hague Convention of 22 December 1986 on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, (1985) 24 I.L.M. 1573.
26. For an example of a convention which includes a distinct limitation period, see United
NationsConvention on Limitation Periodsin the InternationalSale of Goods (1974), 13 I.L.M.
952.
27. 108 S.Ct. 2117 (1988). See also: American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (2d)
Conflict of Laws, arts. 142-143.
28. Ibid. at 2123.

430 The Dalhousie Law Journal

& Co. (South Australia)Pty. Ltd.2 9 In that case, the High Court refused to
revisit the distinction between limitations legislation which extinguishes
a right and that which merely bars a remedy; rather, the Court stated that
the distinction is "firmly and clearly established as a principle of law...
[with] no warrant for discarding it."3
The decision in Tolofson introduced an immediate period of chaos in
respect of pending insurance claims and ongoing litigation as parties,
insureds, insurers, and their counsel took advantage of the decision, or
attempted to do so, to accept or withdraw settlement offers and to amend
pleadings. This consequence is not only supported by anecdotal evidence 3 but is also reflected in the case reports for the first eighteen
months following the December 1994 release of Tolofson. The situation
was well summarized by Goodfellow J. of the Supreme Court of Nova
Scotia in Hendsbee v. Khuber and Stockmal:
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court of Canada did not acknowledge
the dire consequences that will fall upon many litigants as a result of the
change in the law...."
In Hendsbee, the Nova Scotia resident plaintiff, while a passenger in a
taxi, had been injured on 21 February 1993 in an automobile accident in
Saskatchewan. The action was commenced in Nova Scotia on 22 February 1994, one year and one day after the date of the accident. Under the
law of Nova Scotia, the applicable limitation period was two years but,
as we have seen in Tolofson, under Saskatchewan law, the applicable
limitation period was twelve months. Tolofson was released on 15
December. 1994. On application by the defendant, Goodfellow J. dismissed the action and held that if the pleadings of the plaintiff disclosed
"such facts that establish his claim is statute barred, then such amounts to
a failure to disclose a good cause of action .... -33 His sense of justice
offended by the result, Goodfellow J. suggested to counsel that an appeal
be filed with the Court of Appeal on the basis of the doctrines of judicial

29. (1992),66 A.L.J.R. 186.
30. Ibid. at 200 (per Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ.).
31. This "immediate chaos" characterization is supported by discussions with civil litigation
and insurance practitioners. In addition, I can also relate, from my own experience, that, both
on the day of its release and on the following day, I was contacted by a number of concerned
lawyers to discuss the practical effects of Tolofson. In one instance of which I am aware, a
lawyer acting on behalf of an insurer immediately faxed a withdrawal of a settlement offer to
the lawyer representing the plaintiff in an out-of-province automobile accident situation.
Though referred to separate counsel for advice on the efficacy of the withdrawal, I am informed
that the matter was finally settled for an agreed amount less than the original offer of settlement.
32. (1995), 148 N.S.R. (2d) 270, at 281 (S.C.) [hereinafter Hendsbeel.
33. Ibid. at 278.
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extension or estoppel arising from the plaintiff's reliance on the previous
state of the law.
For its part, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dealt with the aftermath
of Tolofson in Brown v. Marwieh.34 In defending an action arising out of
a motor vehicle accident in Alberta, the defendant had pleaded application of the Alberta statute of limitations.35 The chambers judge disallowed
this defence because of the accepted procedural characterization of
limitations statutes and this ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeal.36
There was no further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada by the
defendant. Then came the decision in Tolofson. On a new application by
the defendant to resurrect the limitations defence, the chambers judge and
later the Court of Appeal, applied the doctrine of cause of action estoppel.
In other words, the matter was res judicata as the very issue of the
limitations defence had been finally determined between the parties and
was no longer a live issue in the litigation.
These two cases, from one province, aptly illustrate the unsettling
effects of Tolofson on ongoing litigation. InHendsbee,the pleadings filed
by the plaintiff no longer disclosed a cause of action; in Brown, the issue
of applicability of the limitation period under the lex loci delicti had
already been determined adversely to the interests of a defendant still
within the judicial system. The former defendant benefited from the
retrospective change in the law created by Tolofson; the latter did not. The
key factor was the stage which the litigation had developed to by the time
Tolofson was released.
There are other examples. In Dipalma v. Gavin Estate,37 the defendants applied, following release of Tolofson, to amend their statement of
defence to plead expiration of the limitation period under the lex loci
delicti, the law of Saskatchewan. The cause of action arose out of a motor

34. (1996), 145 N.S.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.).
35. Limitation ofActions Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-15, s. 51(b).
36. (1994), 125 N.S.R. (2d) 389 (C.A.).
37. (1995), 176 A.R. 326 (Q.B.) (Master). In another Alberta case, Ferdais v. Vermeer
Manufacturing Co. (1995), 167 A.R. 380 (Q.B., Master), a products liability claim by an
Alberta plaintiff against a North Dakota manufacturer and its insurer for injuries sustained in
Alberta had been dismissed by the North Dakota court on the basis of forum non conveniens.
The dismissal was made subject to the condition "that defendants waive any statute of
limitations defence that did not exist prior to the dates" the action was commenced in North
Dakota (at 385). In defence to the subsequent action commenced in Alberta, the defendant
manufacturer pleaded the Alberta limitations legislation but its insurer did not. On an
application by the defendants for summary judgment, Master Funduk dismissed the action
against the manufacturer but not that against the insurer. Master Funduk recognized that
whether characterized as procedural, as under the former state of the law, or as substantive, as
under Tolofson, the Alberta limitations period applied, Alberta being both the forum and the
locus delicti.

432 The Dalhousie Law Journal

vehicle accident in Saskatchewan and was commenced in Alberta by the
Alberta plaintiff against the Saskatchewan defendants. The two-year
Alberta limitation period had not expired when the action was commenced but the twelve-month period under Saskatchewan law had
expired. The application to amend was dismissed by the master because
of the obvious prejudice to the plaintiff which could not be compensated
for by costs or adjournment. The master commented:
It appears the defendants at one time were prepared not to make an issue
of the expired Saskatchewan limitation but rather were prepared to attom
to the Alberta court's jurisdiction, and allow the case to be dealt with on
the merits... By refusing the amendment they now seek, the court only
puts them back into the position they apparently had previously
accepted ....

38

A similar motion to amend pleadings was dismissed in the Ontario case
of Hanlan v. Sernesky3 9 in which the motions judge, Kozak J., bluntly

stated:
The plaintiffs have been prejudiced by the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Tolofson and this Court has been persuaded that the proposed amendment, which would bring into play the ruling in that case, would occasion
4
prejudice that could not be compensated by costs or an adjournment. 0
In Miller v. Parkway Rental Ltd.41 the Ontario plaintiff moved for
summary judgment on the basis of a 1991 settlement offer which had not
been accepted before Tolofson was released. The cause of action arose in
relation to a motor vehicle accident in Nova Scotia. The issue for
determination was whether the offer was a common law offer, and,
therefore, subject to the principles of offer and acceptance, or an offer
regulated by the Rules of Civil Procedure.4 2 In dismissing the motion, and
holding the offer to be a common law offer, MacDonald J. observed:
Given that the plaintiff's case may be in jeopardy as a result of Tolofson
v. Jensen [citation omitted], the reasons for the attempt on the part of the
plaintiff to 4assert
the formal validity of the offer in question becomes
3
transparent.

38. Ibid. at 328.
39. [1996] O.J. No. 2433 (QL)(Gen. Div.)
40. Ibid. at para. 16.
41. [1996] O.J. No. 295 (QL) (Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Miller].
42. Ontario,Rules of Civil Procedure,r. 49 equivalent to the former practice of payment into
court.
43. Miller,supra note 41.
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The impact of Tolofson on limitations has also been recorded in decisions
in the courts of British Columbia," Qurbec, 45 and the Northwest
Territories.4 6

Limitations legislation in Canada is generally silent on matters of
private international law. The limitations statutes of seven provinces;
Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, and Alberta,47 contain no provisions either characterizing
limitations for the purpose of private international law or establishing
rules for the applicability of foreign or domestic limitations legislation.
However, the laws of three provinces do contain such provisions. The
Qu6bec Civil Code provides that "prescription is governed by the law
applicable to the merits of the dispute."48 The British Columbia Limitation Act contains the unusual and now superseded provision that when the
substantive law to govern a matter is not that of British Columbia and the
foreign limitations period is characterized as procedural, a court may
apply either the limitations law of British Columbia or of the foreign
' The LimitationsAct of
jurisdiction "if a more just result is produced."49
Newfoundland, in force as of 1 April 1996, expressly states that it
"applies to actions in the province to the exclusion of the [limitations] law

44. Toope v. Syversten (1995), 5 B.C.L.R. (3d) 174 (S.C.) re characterization of limitation
periods in the context of confirming a maintenance order under reciprocal enforcement
legislation. The limitation period under British Columbia law, the enforcing jurisdiction, was
one year; that under the law of Ontario, the originating jurisdiction, two years. The Ontario
order was confirmed.
45. Gordon CapitalCorp. v. Laurentienne G~nirale, [1995] A.Q. No. 529 (QL)(C.A.) in
relation to consideration of forum non conveniens. The action was stayed and the Court
questioned the constitutional validity of the extra-territorial application of Art. 2190 C.C.L.C.
in light of the substantive characterization of limitations legislation.
46. Stewartv. Stewart Estate, [1996] N.W.T.J. No. 48 (QL)(S.C.). Civil action arising from
out of territory motor vehicle accident dismissed because of applicability of locus delicti's
limitations period.
47. Limitations ofActions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258; Statute ofLimitations,R.S.P.E.I. 1988,
c. S-7; LimitationsofActions Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. L-8; Limitation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L. 15;
Limitation ofActions Act, R.S.M. 1987, supra,note 9; LimitationsofActions Act, R.S.S. 1978,
supra, note 7; and Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. supra, note 9, respectively. A Bill
introduced in the New Brunswick Legislature in 1987 would have reformed the characterization of limitations laws by expressly declaring such laws to be substantive for the purposes of
conflict of laws. The Bill received second reading and died on the order paper. See: Bill 103,
LimitationsAct, 5th Sess., 50th Leg., N.B. (1987) in Journalsof the House of Assembly of the
Province of New Brunswick (1987) at 2642 and 2674.
48. See also supra note 20.
49. LimitationsAct, R.S.B.C., supra note 9, s. 13.
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of all other jurisdictions."5 This provision is arguably open to a constitutional challenge as being in relation to extra-provincial property and
civil rights and, arguably, should be read down.5' Until such a judicial
pronouncement, limitations legislation of the locus delicti is effectively
avoided under Newfoundland law. This Newfoundland statute, it should
be noted, is an enactment of the model LimitationsAct approved by the
Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1982.52 No doubt, the Conference
will revisit this matter in light of Tolofson. Finally, at the federal level, the
Federal Court Act, 53 in general, merely incorporates by reference the
provincial limitations or prescription law of the province in which the
cause of action arose. Accordingly, the Act is silent on private international law issues.
Conclusion
In Tolofson, the Supreme Court of Canada modernized the characterization of limitations legislation for the purposes of private international
law. In rejecting the traditional "procedural" characterization of limitations and adopting a "substantive" characterization, the Court moved
Canadian law closer to uniformity with the private international law
principles of other legal systems. Yet at the same time the immediate
impact of the decision was to create a temporary chaos for litigants,
insurance claimants and insurers. Had the reform been introduced as a
statutory amendment there would, no doubt, have been public notice of
the impending change in the law and an express transitional provision
bringing the change in characterization into effect as of a given date.
Stability and certainty in the law would have been maintained. Instead,
the Court's decision in Tolofson constituted a retrospective change in the
law and had immediate effect on both pending claims and litigation. As

50. LimitationsAct, S.N., supra note 9, s. 23.
51. See ConstitutionAct, 1867, s. 92 (13). Reading down s. 23 of the LimitationsAct, ibid.,
would limit provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights to intra-provincial applications.
52. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Sixty-Fourth Annual
Meeting (Ottawa: Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 1983) at 33 and 341.
53. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 39
(1) Except as expressly provided for by any other Act, the laws relating to prescription and
the limitation of actions in force in any province between subject and subject apply to any
proceedings in the court in respect of any cause of action arising in that province.
(2) A proceeding in the court in respect of a cause of action arising otherwise than in a
province shall be taken within 6 years after the cause of action arose.
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a common law rule, the characterization of limitations in private international law was certainly within the proper jurisdiction of the Court to
reform. As lacobucci J. stated in R. v. Salituro:
The courts are the custodians of the common law, and it is their duty to see
that the common law reflects the emerging needs and values of our
society.

Yet, at the same time, the following words of McLachlin J. in Watkins v.
Olafson seem apposite:
There are sound reasons supporting this judicial reluctance to dramatically recast established rules of law. The court may not be in the best
position to assess the deficiencies of the existing law, much less problems
which may be associated with the changes it might make. The court has
before it a single case; major changes in the law should be predicated on
a wider view of how the rule will operate in the broad generality of cases
... Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the long-established
principle that in a constitutional democracy it is the legislature, as the

elected branch of government, which should assume the major responsibility for law reform."

Given that there are approximately 700,000 automobile accidents in
Canada annually and that 4.5 to 8 per cent of these accidents involve
nonresident drivers 6 and therefore raise issues of private international
law, it might have been prudent for the Court to have heeded its own
words in Watkins and awaited legislative intervention. The fact that
legislatures have not acted may, in turn, be taken as evidence of some
measure of satisfaction with the former rule characterizing limitations

54. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 at 678.
55. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750 at 760-61.
56. The insurance industry does not maintain a statistical category of nonresident drivers/
vehicles because that factor is not considered risk-significant. The latest year for which total
accident statistics is available is 1992 in which year there were 689,379 accidents. (Source:
Transport Canada, "Traffic Collision Data" in Road Safety - TRAID(V04)(7 June 1996).
An informal sample survey of provincial Departments of Transportation revealed the
following statistics for the year 1994. In Ontario, the number of drivers involved in accidents
was 405,024 with 373,282 from Ontario (92.16%), 10,155 from out of province (2.5%) and
21,587 of unknown residence (5.33%). Assuming two-vehicle accidents [405,024 - 2 =
202,512] and that nonresident drivers are involved in accidents with Ontario drivers, the
number of accidents involving nonresidents is approximately 5%; i.e. [10,155 - 202,512 =
5.0%]. In New Brunswick, the number of accidents recorded by the Maintenance and Traffic
Branch of the Department of Transportation for 1994 was 13,574 and the number of accidents
involving out of province drivers, 1,106 (8. 1%). In British Columbia, the Traffic Accident
System Database, Research & Evaluation Department, Motor Vehicle Branch, Ministry of
Transportation and Highways records the number of drivers/vehicles involved in accidents in
B.C. in 1994 as 181,548 involving 8,357 nonresident drivers (4.6%). In Saskatchewan, the
Department of Highways reports that 4.7% of the 26,425 accidents involved nonresident
drivers.
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legislation as procedural." That the rule has been altered to a substantive
characterization is, in the final analysis, a welcome development though
it could have been implemented without the judicially-created chaos.

57. Assuming that the forum is not also the locus delicti, one negative effect of a shift to a
substantive characterization of limitations legislation is to raise the transaction costs incurred
in determining the matter. When characterized as procedural, there was little or no cost
involved in determining the applicable limitation period; yet, the substantive characterization
will require a determination of the content of the applicable lex loci delicti, thereby, at least
marginally, raising transaction costs.
For a law and economics perspective on limitations legislation see R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law (4th ed.) (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992) at 587-88:
"If the purpose of the statute of limitations is to reduce the error costs associated with the
use of stale evidence, there is strong argument for applying the statute of the state where the
case is tried because that statute presumably reflects the competence of the courts of that state
to deal with stale evidence. But if the purpose of the statute is just to enable people to plan their
activities with greater certainty, there is an argument for applying the statute of limitations of
the injurer's state, because it is the injurer who is subjected to the uncertainty."
Note that Posner's comparative advantage approach to the analysis of conflicts issues
does not fit well with the situation where the place of injury is not the place of residence of the
injurer.
Transaction costs may also be incurred in litigating the proper characterization of sub
rules associated with the applicable limitation period. Consider, for example, Stewart v.
Stewart (1996), 47 C.P.C. (3d) 82 (B.C.S.C.) in which the court held that the proper
characterization of legislation permitting the extension of a limitation period is substantive but
that the method designated by that legislation to effect the extension is procedural. In Stewart,
an expired limitation period under the lex delicti (Sask.) was held extended when, consistent
with the lexfori, a partial payment had been made but the notice required under the lex delicti
had not been filed.

